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In light of the gravity of the European debt crisis and
the radical measures that were decided on in May
2010, we feel obliged to make this public appeal to
the German federal government,in which we set out
basic considerations for the pending negotiations for
the reform of the euro area. In our opinion, these
considerations are essential for the survival of the
European Monetary Union.
The euro is a key element of European integration,but
it will be endangered if we do not succeed in establish-
ing more fiscal discipline in the future. What Europe
needs is not an economic government but political and
economic mechanisms that effectively limit public and
private indebtedness in the member states. It needs
these mechanisms not only to stabilise national
finances and the common currency but also to achieve
a better balance of growth forces in Europe.
The present crisis is not a currency crisis.
Interpretations that regard the devaluation of the
euro vis-à-vis the dollar as a currency crisis are pure
hysteria.The devaluation is only a partial correction
of the overvaluation of the euro relative to OECD
purchasing power parity that had been building up
since 2003.The improvement in competitiveness for
Europe’s exports on international markets that
comes with the devaluation should be welcomed by
the countries in Europe, especially since they have
not yet recovered from the recession. However,
almost half of German exports are to the euro area
and thus not immediately affected by the devalua-
tion of the euro – just as they were also not affected
by the foregoing revaluation.As originally intended
by its founders, the European Monetary Union has
contributed to immunising the real economy against
exchange rate fluctuations.
The current crisis is due to the debt and financing
problems of some euro member states.The introduc-
tion of the euro induced a convergence of interest
rates in the eurozone countries.As of 1995 the initial
members of the European Monetary Union (except
for Germany) had to pay interest rates on their gov-
ernment bonds that were on average 2.6 percentage
points higher than the rate on German government
bonds, in some cases even 6 percentage points high-
er. With the introduction of the euro this interest
premium disappeared almost completely.A common
capital market was created that provided favourable
financing conditions of a kind that especially the
countries on the southwest periphery of Europe had
not known previously. These favourable conditions
applied to both public and private debtors. As a
result there was a huge capital flow to these coun-
tries that induced a boom in construction and invest-
ment. However, effective mechanisms for limiting
public and private debt were lacking. In many coun-
tries the booms in construction activity developed
into speculative bubbles. The bursting of these bub-
bles is now threatening the solvency of banks. This
has resulted in considerable risks for the public
finances of some countries. Current government
deficits in Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Spain
amount to more than three times the level allowed
by the Stability and Growth Pact (3 percent of
GDP). In Greece, the problem is exacerbated by an
already very high level of government debt.
In the international discussion on sharing the bur-
dens from the crisis,the claim is often made,particu-
larly by the French,that Germany was the main eco-
nomic beneficiary of the single currency, the high
German trade surplus being a reflection of the trade
deficits of the other euro countries.The only truth in
this statement is that the booms in construction and
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Research and the CESifo Group.investment in the countries of the periphery caused
inflation there that reduced the price competitive-
ness of these countries and led to external trade
deficits.In Germany the reverse situation was true.A
large part of savings was channelled abroad through
the banks and relatively little money was invested at
home. Domestic demand weakened, and wages and
prices increased only slowly.This improved the price
competitiveness of the country, and led to a large
external trade surplus. This trade surplus was the
counterpart in the real economy to the capital flows
out of Germany.
In the current political discourse, those who regard
the trade surplus and the combined loss of invest-
ment capital as a sign of Germany’s strength display
an almost tragic misunderstanding of the underlying
economics. Germany’s net investment rate from
1995 to 2008 was the lowest of all OECD countries.
In 2008 only 40 percent of savings in Germany was
invested in the country itself. Economic growth was
correspondingly low. For 1995 to 2008 as a whole,
real growth in Germany was 22 percent, almost the
lowest in the entire OECD. In contrast, during this
period economic growth amounted to 33 percent in
Portugal, 56 percent in Spain, 61 percent in Greece
and an impressive 124 percent in Ireland.
In principle, the flows of capital out of Germany can
be seen as part of a useful convergence process in
Europe,which has also benefited German savers and
property owners. However, these flows were exces-
sive. Too large a part of savings flowed out of Ger-
many and into the countries of the southwest periph-
ery of Europe.The resulting trade imbalances,which
gave rise to large imbalances in external trade, were
too high. The dynamics of the German economy, in
contrast, were impaired.
This critical assessment is based not only on the obser-
vation that the construction and investment boom
degenerated in part into a speculation bubble and that
individual member states are now caught up in a debt
crisis. It is mainly based on the assessment that even
before the crisis broke out there were insufficient con-
straints on public and private borrowing.
Markets and prices did not sufficiently take into
account the risks of investments. It was evident for
some time that the government bonds of different
member states,for example,did not all have the same
degree of creditworthiness. Prior to 2008, however,
investors did not demand interest premiums from
member states whose budget policies created default
risks for their government bonds. No sanctions were
imposed on the violators of the European Stability
and Growth Pact, neither from the capital markets
nor from officials in the European Union.
It was not until the 2008 financial crisis that interest
rates on government bonds began to include premi-
ums for default risks. Contrary to what some of the
debtors have suggested, this is not reprehensible but
is actually necessary for the long-term survival of the
euro. The risk premiums are indeed much smaller
than in the pre-euro era,but they help re-impose the
fiscal discipline that had been lacking and they are
fundamentally necessary for the functioning of the
eurozone capital market. Capital flows are slowed
down, government debtors are effectively disci-
plined and an overheating is avoided. It can now be
expected that more capital will remain in Germany
and will be available for investments in construction
and in the rest of the economy. Domestic demand in
Germany should become stronger and growth will
accelerate again. And, of course, the external trade
surplus should decrease again.
The rescue decisions made by the Council and the
member states on 9/10 May, however, suspended the
no-bailout stipulation of the Maastricht Treaty in order
to prevent a default by Greece and possibly other
member states on their public debts. Without passing
judgment on these decisions, we are nevertheless con-
vinced that these measures should not be extended in
the present form beyond the agreed period of time.
Maintaining them would further destabilise the euro-
zone. The recent packages foresee the complete
bailout of creditors without requiring them to bear any
part of the risks they had taken on. Sparing the credi-
tors would again lead to carelessness in their lending
policies and to an excessive degree of interest-rate
convergence. The disciplining function of the capital
markets would again be undermined, and the incen-
tive to keep government budget deficits under control
would be weakened. German voters are not likely to
accept such a carte blanche guarantee for other coun-
tries. A regime in which Germany is obligated to pay
for other countries’ debts could endanger the euro if
not European integration as a whole. Even if this pre-
vents further crises, the imbalances in foreign trade
and in capital flows would be perpetuated, with nega-
tive consequences for German economic growth.
Proponents of a continuation of the rescue policies
argue that the associated lowering of interest rates
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will allow those countries with high private and pub-
lic indebtedness to reduce their deficits faster in the
current crisis. But the highly indebted countries in
the eurozone have already gained considerable relief
from the rescue packages. Going beyond this and
having additional interest-rate convergence induced
by continued joint liability would be damaging.
Many member states already received considerable
relief from lower interest rates when the euro was
introduced. But they did not redeem their debts as a
result. Evidently, the effects of lower interest bur-
dens were weaker than the incentives for additional
debt financing that went along with lower interest
rates – and with reduced capital market discipline. It
was not until the current crisis made interest spreads
grow again and imposed constraints on new borrow-
ing that policymakers are now seriously attempting
to limit state indebtedness.
For this reason it would be a grave mistake to intro-
duce eurobonds,i.e.common government bonds of all
states of the eurozone,as some countries are currently
proposing. This would perpetuate the mutual bailout
principle and would ultimately destroy the institution-
al basis for a sound fiscal policy in Europe.
Before the rescue package expires, policymakers
must develop a viable concept for future fiscal-policy
rules in Europe. This concept must contain two ele-
ments:more effective political constraints on govern-
ment deficits and debt and most importantly a quasi-
insolvency procedure for member states. The quasi-
insolvency procedure is intended not only to help
overcome future crises. It should also ensure that the
member states keep their debt under control and that
the financial-market participants proceed with
greater caution. It is essential that the rules of the
quasi-insolvency procedure be credible. The institu-
tions responsible for enforcing these rules must be
willing to do so effectively. Unlike the Stability and
Growth Pact or now with the no-bailout stipulation,
the rules must not be circumvented the moment they
are intended to take hold.
In order to understand the conditions under which
such a quasi-insolvency procedure would function, it
is helpful to ask why even the German federal gov-
ernment agreed to the euro rescue plan in the current
crisis, despite its violation of the Maastricht Treaty.
Political pressure from the highly indebted countries
certainly played a role.But the decisive factor behind
the German government’s acceptance of the plan
seems to have been the fear that a sovereign default
in the eurozone would trigger a general capital mar-
ket crisis with concomitant bank failures and yet
another financial and economic crisis. Regardless of
whether this fear was ultimately justified or not, the
risk itself was regarded as too large.As it turned out,
the eurozone was not prepared for this situation.The
lack of preparation contributed to the emergence of
the crisis because investors knew that the eurozone,
in the case of the over-indebtedness of an individual
member state, would hardly risk a formal default.
Because the no-bailout stipulation was not credible,
these states could take on much more debt, without
the interest rates reflecting the risks.
In order to enforce government budget discipline in
Europe, the capital markets must receive credible
signals that in the case of one country’s over-indebt-
edness, the creditors bear liability before help from
EU or other member states can come into play.This
sequencing is essential for inducing creditors to be
cautious when granting loans. But this sequencing is
only credible if there is no risk that the losses that
the creditors must bear will not set off a general
financial and economic crisis.
For this purpose, the capital requirements of the
banks should be increased. If the government bonds
of highly indebted countries must be backed up with
more capital, this in itself will ensure that lending to
these countries will be reduced or that higher inter-
est premiums will be required. It is also necessary to
have a simple,transparent,and rule-determined pro-
cedure for the restructuring of public debts. Only
with such a procedure can one expect that a sover-
eign default will not induce a financial panic.
To enhance the credibility of rules for crises it is nec-
essary to significantly strengthen the EU’s compe-
tence for enforcing budget discipline both before and
during a crisis itself. This competence should be
assumed directly by the European Commission.In the
present crisis the Commission did not perceive its
intrinsic interest as lying in the enforcement of the
Maastricht Treaty but in the expansion of the EU’s
competence that came with the bailout measures. If
the Commission is given the competence for the deter-
mination and enforcement of the conditions under
which aid is granted,it will perceive its own interest to
lie in exercising this competence when a crisis occurs.
How should the fiscal-policy rules for the eurozone
be reformed? In our opinion, the following ten
points are necessary:1. Distressed countries can expect help only if an
imminent inability to fulfil its financial obliga-
tions is unanimously confirmed by the countries
providing the help together with the IMF.
2. Assistance can be provided by covered bonds
bearing interest, or by loans, the yield of which
must be set at a reasonable percentage (possibly
3.5 percentage points) above the European aver-
age.The loans must not exceed a given percent-
age maximum of the distressed country’s GDP.
3. At the same time assistance is granted, the orig-
inal creditors must waive a portion of their
claims through a so-called ‘haircut’. The maxi-
mum percentage to be waived must be clearly
defined beforehand, in order to prevent a panic-
fuelled intensification of the crisis.A reasonable
haircut would be 5 percent per year since the
issuance of the respective government bond.
This would limit the interest premium demand-
ed upfront by the creditors to a maximum of
around 5 percentage points. In addition, an
extension of maturity could be considered for
bonds with less than three years to maturity.The
crucial factor is to provide the capital markets
with a clear calculation framework.
4. The budget of the countries facing quasi-insol-
vency must be placed under the control of the
European Commission. Together with the
country in question, the Commission would
work out a programme to overhaul the state’s
finances, including reforms aimed at strength-
ening economic growth. Disbursement of res-
cue funds must be contingent on compliance
with the conditions set forth by the rescue pro-
gramme.
5. This quasi-insolvency process must under no
circumstances be undermined by other assis-
tance systems that could provide incentives for
opportunistic behaviour, in particular by such
mechanisms as the eurobonds, i.e. commonly
issued government bonds, favoured by some of
the overly indebted countries. Eurobonds entail
an across-the-board equalisation of interest
rates regardless of the creditworthiness of each
debtor country and, for that reason, would be
tantamount to a subsidy to capital flows to those
countries. Eurobonds would give carte blanche
to new debt excesses, in addition to exerting
negative effects upon economic growth in
Germany.A particular risk in the coming nego-
tiations is that Germany will be pressured to
accept eurobonds in return for a quasi-insolven-
cy procedure.
It is also necessary,in our opinion,that the polit-
ical limits to public debt be strengthened by
rules along the lines of the Stability and Growth
Pact.It must be stressed,however,that these lim-
its cannot substitute for the discipline imposed
by the markets through the interest spreads
resulting from the individual countries’ credit-
worthiness. The following provisions should be
established:
6. The deficit limit set by the Stability and Growth
Pact should be modified in accordance with each
country’s debt-to-GDP ratio, in order to demand
more debt discipline early enough from the high-
ly indebted countries. As an example, the limit
could be tightened by one percentage point for
every ten percentage points that the debt-to-
GDP ratio exceeds the 60-percent limit.A coun-
try with an 80-percent debt-to-GDP ratio, for
instance, would be allowed a maximum deficit of
1 percent of GDP,while a country with a 110-per-
cent debt-to-GDP ratio would be required to
have a budget surplus of at least 2 percent.
7. Penalties for exceeding the debt limits must
apply automatically,without any further political
decisions, once Eurostat has formally ascer-
tained the deficits. The penalties can be of a
pecuniary nature and take the form of covered
bonds collateralised with privatisable state
assets, and they can also contain non-pecuniary
elements such as the withdrawal of voting rights.
8. In order to ascertain deficit and debt-to-GDP
ratios,Eurostat must be given the right to direct-
ly request information from every level of the
national statistics offices and to conduct inde-
pendent controls on site of the data gathering
procedures.
9. Finally, in case all the above assistance and con-
trol systems fail and insolvency approaches, the
country in question may be asked to leave the
eurozone by a majority of the eurozone members.
10. A voluntary exit from the eurozone must be pos-
sible at any time.
We are Europeans by conviction and favour the fur-
ther integration of the EU. However, we firmly
believe that the European model will fail if it does
not manage to strengthen once again the individual
responsibility of the countries of Europe. For this
reason we see no alternative to the proposals we
have outlined here.
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